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Editorial
Integrating development and evolution in psychology:
Looking back, moving forward
Modern psychology, from its inception, has been informed by ideas imported
from related fields of inquiry. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that Sigmund
Freud’s familiarity with Darwin’s theory of evolution contributed to the development of
his own ideas about the determinants of psychological functioning (Sulloway, 1992).
Likewise, the founder of the first psychology laboratory in the United States, Edward
Titchener, explicitly used conceptualizations imported from other sciences as he
attempted to position our fledgling discipline among these fields, writing in 1898 “we can
represent modern psychology as the exact counterpart of modern biology” (p. 450). This
reliance on other sciences—biology, in particular—has continued into recent times, as
evolutionary psychologists (Buss, 2007; Pinker, 2002) have turned to evolutionary
biology for ideas that might help explain some of our behaviors, and as quantitative
behavior geneticists (Plomin, DeFries, & Fulker, 2006; DiLalla, 2004) have turned to
population genetics for ideas that might help explain the transmission of behavioral
characteristics across generations and the distribution of such characteristics across
populations.
In many quarters—in the popular press and in introduction to psychology
textbooks, in particular—the ideas generated by evolutionary psychology and behavior
genetics have been met with excitement and a sense that our field is maturing. However,
as these branches of psychology have become more prominent in the field, new ideas that
are not necessarily consistent with their tenets have been surfacing in the neurosciences,
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genetics, developmental biology, and philosophy, and it is these latter ideas that stand to
shape psychological theory in the decades to come. It has often served psychology well in
the past to attend to advances in allied fields, but if we are to benefit from importing
biological ideas into our field, we must be sure that our biology is up to date and accurate
(Finlay, 2007).
Among the psychologists who have worked to infuse state-of-the-art
understandings of biology into psychology is Gilbert Gottlieb, who died in the summer of
2006, and to whom this special issue is dedicated. As a young man drafted into the army
during the Korean War and assigned to work in counter-intelligence in Austria, Gottlieb
was struck by how the people in Austria who had been displaced by World War II varied
in their responses to the stresses associated with their dislocation; some people appeared
to be considerably more resilient than others. This experience induced Gottlieb to pursue
a degree in psychology when he returned to the United States, and ultimately led him to
seek a PhD in Clinical and Experimental Psychology in Duke University’s joint
psychology-zoology training program in animal behavior. While at Duke, Gottlieb’s
approach to psychology was importantly influenced by Peter H. Klopfer, then a member
of Duke’s zoology department, and ultimately one of Gottlieb’s significant mentors. In
this context, Gottlieb followed his interest in the origins of behavioral variability by
empirically studying imprinting in birds, a topic that led him to read widely in the
literatures of evolutionary and developmental biology, and that left him with a very
different knowledge base than many of his contemporaries in psychology. In addition, his
intellectual explorations as an undergraduate had brought him into contact with the notion
of interactionism, and these ideas left him with a lifelong perspective that emphasized the

Development and Evolution 4
dynamic interplay between “biological” and “experiential” factors during the
development of behavioral characteristics.
Among Gottlieb’s significant discoveries were the following two facts: 1) that some of
the experiential factors that contribute to behavioral development are encountered prior to
birth, and (2) that some of the important experiential factors encountered after birth are
non-obvious (in the sense that they would be unlikely to draw an experimenter’s attention
prior to the sort of careful analysis required to reveal their effects on development). These
findings were among the large body of research—much of it reviewed in the papers of
this special issue—that challenged a notion prevalent in psychology since the middle of
the 20th century, the idea that some behaviors are “instinctive,” “hardwired,” “genetic,” or
otherwise determined prior to the actual unfolding of development (Gottlieb, 1997).
Gottlieb never manipulated genes in his elegant experiments, and as a result, his
findings typically emphasized the contributions of experiential factors to behavioral
development. Nevertheless, his detailed understanding of biology allowed him to
acknowledge the importance of genetic factors in development while maintaining that such
factors could never independently produce full-blown behavioral traits. Arguing on the basis
of psychobiological data, Gottlieb maintained that development could best be characterized
as a probabilistic process involving both genetic and non-genetic factors. In explicating his
conception of probabilistic epigenesis, he explicitly held (see, for example, Gottlieb, 2004)
that development always results from interactions among developmental resources that
includes both types of factors, a position that became one of the pillars of developmental
systems theory; the latter collection of ideas has become increasingly prominent in
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psychological writings in the past decade (Nelson, 2007; Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray,
2001; Thelen & Smith, 1998).
As new data from various branches of biology have poured into our digital
libraries, it has become clear that the biological ideas we should be importing into
psychology are those consistent with Gottlieb’s position, not necessarily with the
positions characteristic of evolutionary psychology or quantitative behavior genetics.
Although the contributors to this special issue have varying stances regarding the extent
to which they believe these positions can be integrated, they generally agree that a
developmental approach like the one Gottlieb advocated will yield essential insights into
the origins of our psychological characteristics; in some cases, they are openly dubious
about the prospect of quantitative behavior genetics or evolutionary psychology yielding
similarly valuable insights. In these cases, this lack of faith in these otherwise popular
ideas results from an awareness that biologists no longer subscribe to the sort of genetic
determinism that characterized biology in the middle of the 20th century and that remains
embedded in the often-unstated assumptions of evolutionary psychology and quantitative
behavior genetics. Instead, contemporary biologists acknowledge the importance of
epigenetic processes in development, lending support to Gottlieb’s view of development
(Harper, 2005; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; Meaney & Szyf, 2005). As the contributors to this
special issue see it, the ideas associated with this view represent valuable new
contributions to psychology.
Although the ideas discussed in the following papers have only begun to attract
the attention of significant numbers of psychologists in recent years, many of these ideas
have a longer history in biology. Consequently, it is helpful to begin with an historical
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examination of the intellectual contexts that contributed to these ideas, and to consider
the debates that have ensued as scholars have begun to grapple with the challenges that
new data and theory from the developmental sciences have presented to an older biology.
Griffiths and Tabery (2008) trace the 1995 dispute between Gottlieb and several
quantitative behavior geneticists to an earlier (1920’s and 1930’s) disagreement between
R.A. Fisher and L. Hogben about the nature of gene-environment interaction; along the
way, they provide helpful information regarding the origins and shifting meanings of the
organizing concepts norm of reaction and reaction range. In contrast to Gottlieb,
Griffiths and Tabery see the approaches of developmentally-oriented psychobiologists
and biometrically-oriented behavior geneticists as complementary and equally valid, and
they suggest that knowledge gleaned from the two projects can be integrated. The key to
resolving the dispute, they suggest, is recognizing the extent to which scientists of
different theoretical orientations are concerned with potential variation that has not yet
been detected in any real population. Finally, the distinction they use between two
different conceptions of the gene—developmental/molecular genes and Mendelian
genes—is one that has the potential to clarify thinking about the origins of traits, and as
such represents a conceptual advance that could very well drive future scientific
syntheses.
In The growth of developmental thought: Implications for a new evolutionary
psychology, Lickliter (2008) considers how recent advances in the developmental
sciences might contribute to the emergence of a cohesive theory of development,
heredity, and evolution. Although development and evolution were understood in
Darwin’s time to be integrally related to one another, the Modern Synthesis devised by
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biologists in the early 20th century was a theory of evolution that gave no role whatsoever
to developmental phenomena. As a result, most evolutionary psychologists today make
the mistake of ignoring the role of development in evolution, and continue to accept the
conceptual separation between nature (genes) and nurture that characterized the Modern
Synthesis. In an effort to motivate psychologists to seek a developmentally plausible
evolutionary psychology, Lickliter both criticizes the unstated assumption of genetic
determinism that lies at the heart of current evolutionary psychology, and reviews data
from a variety of sources, all of which support Gottlieb’s contention that behavioral
phenotypes emerge epigenetically from the bidirectional interaction of genetic and nongenetic resources, resources that constitute developing biological systems. These data
further indicate that behavioral phenotypes themselves can ultimately influence
subsequent evolution. In assembling this information, Lickliter has proffered a cogent
presentation of the core tenets of developmental systems theory. The developmentallybased evolutionary psychology Lickliter envisions would incorporate the idea that a
satisfying understanding of evolution depends on a satisfying understanding of
development, because it is development that produces the phenotypes that natural
selection operates on in the first place.
Like the authors of the first two papers in this special issue, Moore (2008) believes
that research psychologists in general would benefit from adopting a developmental
perspective informed by emerging understandings in molecular, developmental, and
evolutionary biology. However, he foresees a major obstacle to the establishment of a theory
that can explain both data collected in studies of population genetics and data collected in
studies of development, because population geneticists have traditionally attempted to
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explain variation in traits across populations whereas developmentalists have traditionally
attempted to explain the emergence of traits in individual organisms. Although both
approaches were designed—and seem to their adherents—to address questions about the
factors that contribute to the appearance of our traits, Moore finds the two approaches to be
incompatible. Theoretically, it might be possible for the population-based approach of
behavior geneticists to proceed independently of the organism-based approach of
developmental scientists, but because evolutionary phenomena (which occur at the level of
populations) have important influences on developmental phenomena, and because
developmental phenomena (which occur at the level of individual organisms) have
important effects on evolution, a theoretical framework that can accommodate data collected
at both levels of analysis would seem to be imperative. However, because the data of
molecular and developmental biology have now made it clear that genetic factors cannot
independently cause the development of phenotypic characteristics, it remains unclear what
a unified theory encompassing both population-level and organism-level phenomena would
look like.
A potentially fruitful path to such a theory might be discovered by studying the
interdisciplinary field of evolutionary-developmental biology—Evo-Devo to its
practitioners—the ascendancy of which represents a sea-change in biology; for the first
time since the Modern Synthesis was completed in the 1930’s, the past decade has seen
widespread and serious consideration of developmental questions by scholars of diverse
fields including evolutionary biology, genetics, paleontology, and molecular biology. In
the final, forward-looking article of this special issue, Robert (2008) envisions a new subfield of psychology called “evolutionary developmental psychobiology,” which he sees
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as being analogous to Evo-Devo within biology. After taking a brief critical look at how
evolutionary theory has been utilized by psychologists to date, Robert describes some of
the research questions—and empirical results—that have emerged from laboratories
operating within the Evo-Devo paradigm; the examples presented illustrate the
advantages that accrue when developmental and evolutionary analyses are successfully
integrated within a single interdisciplinary project. Robert’s suggestion that the
behavioral sciences would benefit from adopting a similar approach is supported by a
consideration of the valuable scientific insights reaped from Gottlieb’s work, a rare
example of a psychological research program motivated by both evolutionary and
developmental questions. In the interest of providing helpful guidance, Robert ends his
paper by outlining what it would really mean for psychologists to begin taking both
developmental and evolutionary considerations seriously as they plan their research.
Psychologists have always turned to biologists, among other scholars, for ideas
about how to approach psychological research questions in a productive manner. Moving
forward, it will be important to develop new ideas in psychology that are consistent with
new ideas in biology; biologists are increasingly concerned with developmental
questions, and have consequently generated data that have forced them to reject some of
their older ideas about the origins of our characteristics. As psychologists are increasingly
exposed to new ideas in biology, the idea that behaviors can be determined by genetic
factors independently of development—or that evolutionary analysis alone can provide a
satisfactory explanation of our psychological characteristics—will give way to new ideas
consistent with the developmental systems perspective championed by Gilbert Gottlieb
throughout his illustrious scientific career.

Development and Evolution 10
References
Buss, D. M. (2007). Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the mind (3rd ed.). Needham
Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 	
  
DiLalla, L. F. (2004). Behavior genetics principles: Perspectives in development, personality,
and psychopathology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Finlay, B. L. (2007). Endless minds most beautiful.Developmental Science, 10, 30 – 34.
Gottlieb, G. (1997). Synthesizing nature-nurture: Prenatal roots of instinctive behavior.
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Gottlieb, G. (2004). Normally occurring environmental and behavioral influences on gene
activity: From central dogma to probabilistic epigenesis. In C. G. Coll, E. L. Bearer, & R.
M. Lerner (Eds.), Nature and nurture: The complex interplay of genetic and
environmental influences on human behavior and development (pp. 85 – 106). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Griffiths, P. E. & Tabery, J. (2008). Behavioral genetics and development: Historical and
conceptual causes of controversy. New Ideas in Psychology, 26, 332 – 352.
Harper, L. V. (2005). Epigenetic inheritance and the intergenerational transfer of experience.
Psychological Bulletin, 131, 340 – 360.
Jablonka, E., & Lamb, M. J. (2005). Evolution in four dimensions: Genetic, epigenetic,
behavioral, and symbolic variation in the history of life. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
Lickliter, R. (2008). The growth of developmental thought: Implications for a new evolutionary
psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 26, 353 – 369.
Meaney, M. J., & Szyf, M. (2005). Maternal care as a model for experience-dependent chromatin
plasticity? Trends in Neurosciences, 28, 456 – 463.

Development and Evolution 11
Moore, D. S. (2008). Individuals and populations: How biology’s theory and data have interfered
with the integration of development and evolution. New Ideas in Psychology, 26, 370 -386.
Nelson, K (2007). Young minds in social worlds: Experience, meaning, and memory. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Oyama, S., Griffiths, P. E., & Gray, R. D. (2001). Cycles of contingency: Developmental systems
and evolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pinker, S. (2002). The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature. New York: Viking.
Plomin, R., DeFries, J. C., & Fulker, D. W. (2006). Nature and nurture during infancy and early
childhood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Robert, J. S. (2008). Taking old ideas seriously: Evolution, development, and human behavior. New
Ideas in Psychology, 26, 387 – 404.
Sulloway, F. J. (1992). Freud, biologist of the mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1998). Dynamic systems theories. In W. Damon (Series Ed.) & R. M.
Lerner (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 1. Theoretical models of human
development (5th ed., pp. 563-634). New York: Wiley.
Titchener, E. B. (1898). The postulates of a structural psychology. The Philosophical Review, 7,
449 – 465.

Development and Evolution 12

Author Note
David S. Moore
Pitzer College, 1050 N. Mills Avenue, Claremont, CA 91711, USA
E-mail address: dmoore@pitzer.edu

